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JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court had jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, since it is a consolidated 
appeal from the district court of a matter over which the Court of 
Appeals did not have original jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals 
now has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
as a case transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court. 
Appellate jurisdiction was originally invoked by reason 
of Notices of Appeal filed in compliance with Rule 3.(a) of the Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, namely, the Notice of Appeal dated September 
16, 1991, which was deemed to have given notice of an appeal of 
the Default Judgment entered nunc pro tunc as of August 22, 1991, 
and by reason of the Notice of Appeal dated Monday February 24, 
1992, which gave notice of an appeal of the Order dated January 
23, 1992 denying defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, 
which Motion was filed on November 18, 1991 and was likewise 
deemed to have referred to the same Default Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appellant asserts that the standard of review under 
Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1991) is whether the 
trial court abused its discretion, and the pertinent issues are 
as follows: 
1. Did the trial court err by sanctioning the failure 
to respond to discovery with a Default Judgment entered in the 
principal sum of $12,559.70 (giving no allowance for the $11,050 
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plus interest claimed as a credit) on the basis of an order entered 
when defendant was unrepresented by counsel, where after the 
appearance of new counsel and the breakdown of settlement negotiations, 
appropriate response was made to the discovery within a month 
despite defendant's principal officer being in Chile? 
2. Did the trial court err by refusing to set aside in 
the interest of justice a Default Judgment which resulted from a 
sanction for the failure to respond to discovery and which Default 
Judgment was entered in the principal sum of $12,559.70 (giving no 
allowance for the $11,050 plus interest claimed as a credit) on 
the basis of an order entered when defendant was unrepresented by 
counsel, where after the appearance of new counsel and the breakdown 
of settlement negotiations, appropriate response was made to the 
discovery within a month despite defendant's principal officer 
being in Chile? 
RULE TO BE INTERPRETED 
Rule 60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
• • • • 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by plaintiff to collect a debt 
on an account. The action was defended on the basis of payments, 
that credits omitted in the accounting offset at least the amount 
plaintiff claimed. Following the filing of a motion to compel a 
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response to discovery, the trial court ordered interrogatories 
answered within 10 days at a time when defendant was without 
counsel. New counsel entered into settlement negotiation before 
answering the interrogatories. Once the settlement negotiations 
failed, the interrogatories were answered within 30 days despite 
the absence of a key principal of defendant. Nevertheless, the 
sanction of a Default Judgment was entered and the trial court 
refused to set that Judgment aside. 
The facts in more detail are as follows, with citations 
to the record on appeal (ROA): 
1. This was a collection action based on defendant's 
alleged failure to timely pay an account with plaintiff. ROA at 2. 
2. Summons in this action was served on defendant 
on December 6, 1990, along with a copy of the Complaint dated 
November 2, 1990. ROA at 7. 
3. Following receipt of defendants1 Answer, and on 
January 3, 1991, plaintiff served defendant with Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, 
bearing that same date of January 3, 1991. ROA at 10, 12. 
4. On April 3, 1991, plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel 
defendant to respond to that discovery, which Motion was followed 
by a Request to Submit for Decision dated April 19, 1991. ROA at 
13, 21. 
5. A couple of days later, on April 22, 1991, defendant's 
attorney, Terry C. Turner, mailed his Withdrawal of Counsel, which 
was followed by the plaintiff's Notice to Appear or Appoint New 
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Counsel dated May 1, 1991. ROA at 28, 30. 
6. While defendant was without counsel, a Minute Entry 
was made dated April 23, 1991 granting "defendant's" Motion to 
Compel, including reasonable attorney's fees of $127.50, noting 
the lack of opposition. The Minute Entry also required a response 
within ten days to avoid "dismissal." ROA at 23. 
7. Plaintiff's counsel then wrote the trial court to 
explain that there had been a mix-up in the designations, and that 
it was plaintiff fs Motion, warranting the striking of defendant's 
Answer, and submitted a corresponding Order. ROA at 26. 
8. The Order thus submitted, which required a response 
to discovery within ten days, was executed on May 1, 1991, and 
followed up with a corresponding Amended Minute Entry dated May 9, 
1991, all while defendant was without counsel. ROA at 24, 32. 
9. On or about May 10, 1991, Delwin T. Pond was retained 
to represent the defendant, and the defendant's principal advised 
its new attorney of the need to answer some interrogatories and 
gave no indication of a desire postpone or avoid that task. A 
copy of his affidavits attesting to these facts and others referred 
to hereinbelow is attached hereto. ROA at 40, 81. 
10. However, Mr. Pond felt there was a good possibility 
to settle the entire matter and on that date he spoke with plaintiff's 
counsel concerning the possibility of settlement, which conversation 
was followed by an exchange of documentation, including a document 
dated May 26, 1987 showing the items returned by defendant to 
plaintiff for a total credit of $11,050. ROA at 82, 84. 
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11. Defendant halted these negotiations by means of 
a letter to Mr. Pond dated June 3, 1991, a copy of which is attached 
hereto, indicating that no credit would be given for those items 
and setting a deadline of June 14, 1991 for the response to discovery* 
ROA at 38. 
12. Mr. Pond immediately forwarded a copy of this letter 
to defendant and followed that up with a telephone call on June 
10, 1991. However, the officer with the information needed to 
respond to discovery had gone to Chile for a month. ROA at 41. 
13. After contacting other principals of the defendant 
and trying on numerous occasions to contact defendant's former 
attorney, Mr. Pond was finally able to get through to the officer 
in Chile so he could draft an accurate response, which response 
was signed by an officer of defendant's available locally, and 
served July 3, 1991. ROA at 41, 82-83, 43. A copy of these 
Answers to Interogatories is attached hereto. ROA at 75. 
14. Meanwhile, plaintiff filed a Motion for Entry of 
Default dated June 27, 1991. On July 3, 1991 defendant responded 
by serving an Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for 
Entry of Judgment setting forth the pertinent foregoing facts. 
Plaintiff then filed a Supplemental Affidavit of Leslie Van Frank 
dated July 10, 1991 and a Request to Submit for Decision dated 
July 16, 1991. ROA at 33, 40, 44, 47. 
15. By means of a Minute Entry dated July 31, 1991, 
the trial court granted plaintiff's said Motion for Entry of Default. 
It then executed the Order and Default Judgment, the latter granting 
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judgment for the $12,559.70 principal sought (giving no allowance 
for the $11,050 plus interest in credit), which together with 
interest, costs, and attorneys1 fees brought the total judgment to 
$18,103.95. On March 16, 1992, this Order and Default Judgment 
were entered nunc pro tunc as of August 22, 1991. ROA at 49, 50, 
135, 139(?). 
16. A Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was the 
only post judgment motion, and was filed on November 18, 1991. It 
was supported by a Memorandum and an Affidavit of Delwin T. Pond 
and copies of the responses to discoverye ROA at 62, 64, 81, 75. 
17. A Request for Hearing on the matter was denied 
in a Minute Entry dated December 19, 1991, and the Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment was denied in an Order dated and entered 
January 23, 1992. ROA at 100, 105. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. There was no willfulness in the failure to respond 
to discovery which would justify the harsh sanction of a default 
judgment. 
The cases require a showing of willfulness, bad faith, 
or fault to justify sanctioning a failure to respond in a timely 
manner to discovery, and especially to justify the harsh sanction 
of the entry of a default judgment. In the instant matter, there 
was no need to "deter misconduct." There was no "aggravated 
misconduct." There was no "willful and deliberate disobedience of 
discovery orders." There was no "bad faith conduct." There was 
nothing that would rise to the level of "intentional failure," or 
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anything close to demonstrating willfulness. 
2. The harsh sanction of a default judgment should have 
been set aside in the interest of justice. 
Once the default judgment in the sum of $18,103.95 plus 
interest and costs had been entered, it should have been set aside 
in the interest of justice in view of the neglect being excusable 
and since the defendant's credits may well have completely offset 
the principal amounts claimed by the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THERE WAS NO WILLFULNESS IN THE FAILURE TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY 
WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY THE HARSH SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
In 1984, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
the imposition of sanctions when a party fails to respond to an 
order compelling discovery in a case quoted several times since by 
the Utah Court of Appeals, namely, First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n 
v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984). 
In that case, the Supreme Court emphasized that for such 
sanctions to be imposed, there needed to be an element of willfulness 
in the failure to respond to the order compelling discovery: 
The general rule is that a party in a civil 
case who refuses to respond to an order compelling 
discovery is subject to sanctions pursuant to 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). [Citation.] The 
sanctions are intended to deter misconduct in 
connection with discovery, [citation], and 
require a showing of "willfulness, bad faith, 
or fault" on the part of the non-complying 
party. Id. [Emphasis added.] 
Obviously, more than the mere failure to respond is 
required for the sanctions to be imposed. Whereas a simple failure 
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to respond to summons justifies entry of a default and default 
judgment, a simple failure to respond to discovery does not* 
The party seeking a sanction for the failure to respond bears the 
burden of demonstrating not only a failure to respond to discovery, 
but that the failure was willful, or there was bad faith, or some 
other additional fault. 
In First Federal, a civil case, the issue was whether 
the defendant wrongfully retrieved a check after being paid for 
it* When she was asked to admit taking the check, she affirmatively 
refused to answer, and maintained this refusal despite an order 
compelling a response. Thus willfulness was clearly present. 
The opinion in Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 
P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989) included a quotation of some of the same 
language of the Supreme Court quoted above. That language was 
used by the Court of Appeals to show that it is harsh to sanction 
a party for failure to comply with discovery: 
Imposing sanctions for a party's refusal to 
respond to a court order compelling discovery 
is a harsh sanction and therefore, requires "a 
showing of 'willfulness, bad faith, or fault' 
on the part of the non-complying party." 
Id. at 961. [Emphasis added.] 
This Arnica court went on to say that although wrongful 
intent need not be shown, willfulness does involve at least an 
intentional failure: 
"Willful failure" has been defined as "'any 
intentional failure as distinguised from 
involuntary noncompliance. ...'" Id. 
The sanction in the Arnica case was upheld. The non-complying 
party failed to demonstrate that there was any inability to comply. 
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Although no findings were made of "willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault," the record clearly showed the existence thereof, 
allowing the the imposition of sanctions to be upheld. 
The record in this case clearly demonstrates a 
pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form 
of willful and deliberate disobedience of 
discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and 
attempted witness tampering* In light of this 
overwhelming evidence of willful and bad faith 
conduct, the trial court's failure to make a 
specific finding of willfulness was not reversible 
error, ^d. at 962. 
In the case of Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 
P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1990), other factors seemed to have reduced 
the burden of showing "willfulness, bad faith, or fault." Although 
answers to the interrogatories were tendered at the hearing on the 
motion for sanctions, default judgment was entered against the 
plaintiff based on the failure to respond in a timely manner. 
The Schoney case had been pending for five years at the 
trial court level. There had been five amended complaints. The 
plaintiff had narrowly escaped summary judgment. The trial court 
obviously was growing impatient and wanted to move the case along. 
The court had imposed a discovery cut-off date, and the trial date 
was set for only a few weeks thereafter. The failure to respond 
hurt the defendant's position, not only with respect to the discovery 
propounded, but also with respect to any follow-up discovery that 
might be deemed appropriate in light of the responses. 
Thus in the Schoney case, the failure to respond in a 
timely manner became much more analogous to a failure to respond 
in a timely manner to a summons. Therefore, the appellate court 
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concluded there had not been an abuse of discretion "given the 
posture of this casec" Id. at 586. 
In the case of Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452 (Utah 
App* 1991), the issue was whether the trial court abused its 
discretion when it set aside the default judgment it previously 
entered as a discovery sanction. An order requiring the payment 
of additional costs and attorney fees had been substituted as the 
discovery sanction. 
The Court of Appeals first found that the conduct of the 
sanctioned party, including obnoxious litigation strategies, did 
indeed rise to the level which would justify discovery sanctions. 
Therefore, the appellate court probably would not have reversed 
the trial court had it left the default judgment in place, and 
would have reversed had there been no sanction imposed. 
Specifically, the defendants had avoided service of 
process and had to be served by publication. They then refused to 
cooperate with discovery over a period of two years. Default 
judgment had been entered once for this failure to respond to 
discovery and was then set aside. 
Even after this, defendants continued to be elusive and 
uncooperative, resulting in a motion to compel, which was granted. 
One appearance at a deposition resulted, but when no documents 
were produced, and other depositions scheduled, the defendants did 
not appear. Hence the second default judgment was entered. 
In upholding the trial court's decision to substitute 
another sanction for that this second default judgment, the Darrington 
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opinion stated that "default judgment is an unusually harsh sanction 
that should be meted out with caution," citing Arnica, Id, at 
546. [Emphasis added.] 
The Darrington court then cited Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 
92 (Utah 1986) for the proposition that the trial court was within 
its discretion in setting aside the default judgment. 
In the instant matter, there was no "willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault" of the type necessary to impose discovery sanctions. 
The only fault that might exist would be negligencef that is, excusable 
neglect. And that would not be the kind of fault meant. Under 
the principles of ejusdem generis, the fault needs to be of a type 
analogous to willfulness or bad faith. Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 
P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant matter, there was no need to "deter 
misconduct." There was no "aggravated misconduct." There was no 
"willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders." There 
was no "bad faith conduct." There was nothing that would rise to 
the level of "intentional failure," or anything close to demonstrating 
willfulness. 
Rather, as indicated in the affidavits of Delwin T. Pond 
attached hereto, the defendant's principal advised its new attorney 
of the need to answer some interrogatories and gave no indication 
of a desire postpone or avoid that task. ROA at 81. After a period 
of negotiation, there were the strenuous efforts described in the 
affidavits of Delwin T. Pond to comply with the discovery requests 
despite that principal being in Chile at the time. ROA 41, 82-83. 
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It is true that these efforts did not reach fruition until 19 days 
after the 11-day deadline set by opposing counsel. But there was 
certainly no willfulness nor bad faith in this simple failure to 
comply in a timely manner. 
Likewise there were no factors which would justify a 
lower standard of willfulness. This matter had not been pending 
two to five years. There had been no discovery cut-off date or trial 
date set. 
Even had there been such willfulness as to justify 
imposing sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, it would 
certainly not rise to the level of justifying the entry of a 
default judgment, "an unusually harsh sanction that should be 
meted out with caution." Darrington, supra, at 546. 
2. THE HARSH SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET 
ASIDE IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. 
Rule 60(b) provides: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative 
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding 
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
... [Emphasis added.] 
In the first part of the opinion found in Katz v. Pierce, 
732 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court recited some basic 
principles to be applied in ruling on a motion under Rule 60(b): 
The court should be generally indulgent toward 
setting a judgment aside where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse for the defendant's 
failure to answer and when timely application 
is made. Where there is doubt about whether a 
default should be set aside, that doubt should 
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be resolved in favor of doing so. 
That case also suggested the trial court consider the 
preference to allow the presentation of all claims and defenses, 
the unfairness of a party's conduct, the resulting hardships, as 
well as the fact that the trial court should liberally grant 
relief from a default. 
In the instant matter, the hardship to the defendant of 
leaving the judgment in place was extreme, and it was in the interest 
of justice to allow the presentation of all defenses. 
In response to the plaintiff's Request for Production of 
Documents, defendant produced a copy of the letter to plaintiff 
dated May 26, 1987 itemizing the returns resulting in a credit of 
$11,050 on that date, a copy of which letter is attached to the 
Affidavit of Delwin T. Pond dated November 15, 1991 attached 
hereto. ROA at 84. This credit was wrongfully refused by defendant. 
Thus although the plaintiff sued for the principal amount of 
$12,559.70, that amount was only $1,509.70 more than the omitted 
credit. 
Discovery on the part of the defendant had not been 
pursued. It might well have shown that the principal amount owing 
was not $12,55 9.70 before allowing any credit for the returns, but 
$10,873.37, as indicated in the letter to defendant from plaintiff's 
attorney dated November 28, 1989, a copy of which is attached 
hereto. ROA at 80. In the latter case, the credit due defendant 
in 1987 would exceed the amount due the plaintiff in 1989. 
The furtherance of justice required that the defendant be 
17 
allowed to present its defenses rather than being subjected to a 
default judgment in the sum of $18,103.95 plus interest and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
There was not the requisite showing of willfulness, bad 
faith, or fault to justify the harsh sanction of the entry of a 
default judgment for the failure to respond in a timely manner to 
discovery requests. Once the default judgment in the sum of 
$18,103.95 plus interest and costs had been entered, it should have 
been set aside in the interest of justice in view of the neglect 
being excusable and since a trial on the merits may well have 
shown that the defendant's credits had completely offset the 
principal amounts claimed by the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff's 
Complaint should have been dismissed, no cause of action. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the Order and Default 
Judgment entered below and remand for a continuation of the litigation, 
DATED this //~"~ day of tf<^ 1992. 
LYNN P. HEWARD & DELWIN T. POND 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
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D e l w i n T. Pond, Esqe 
923 East 5375 South 
Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Re: GRO Enterprises dba Chicago Barter vs National Insurance 
Marketing Services, Inc. 
Dear Mr. Pond: 
I am in receipt of your note of May 29, 1991 with respect to 
National Insurance Marketing Services, Inc/s alleged credit for 
defective or outdated merchandise in the amount of $11,050.00. 
After review of my file, this is the same claim that your client 
has been making throughout the pendency of this lawsuit. My client 
has no record of ever receiving any return items, and cannot credit 
your client for the claimed returns. The first my client had ever 
heard of any claimed credit was in late November, 1989 in response 
to a demand letter that this office had sent. My client is 
unwilling at this time to allow your client any credit for the 
claimed returns, and has instructed us to proceed with the lawsuit. 
Accordingly, and as you know, the court recently ordered that 
your client respond to the outstanding discovery by May 11, 1991, 
or its answer would be stricken and default entered. Because Mr. 
Turner withdrew as counsel, I sent notice to your client of an 
additional 20 days within which to appear or appoint new counsel. 
That time expired on May 21, 1991. Your client has had more than 
ample opportunity to answer the discovery, and on June 14, 1991, I 
will approach the court for an order entering their default if 
answers to the discovery are not delivered to this office before 
then. 
Del win T. Pond, Esq. 
June 4, 1991 
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If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter 
further, please do not hesitate to callc 
Very truly yours, 
LVF: cp 
cc: Chicago Barter Corporation 
Dunn and Bradstreet 
Delwin T. Pond #2623 
Attorney for Defendant 
923 East 5375 South 
Executive Park Drive 
Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Tel.d (801) 264-8040 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GRO ENTERPRISES, INC, 
CHICAGO BARTER CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
dba ] 
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING 
SERVICES, INC, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant* 
AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ENTRY 
> OF JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 90-0906404-CN 
) Judge Je Dennis Frederick 
COMES NOW, the defendant, by and through his attorney, 
Delwin T. Pond, and hereby submitts the following Affidavit in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Judgment* 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Delwin T, Pond, first being duly sworn on oath deposes 
and says as follows: 
1. I have been retained by the defendant, National 
Insurance Marketing Services, Inc., a Utah Corporation, to represent 
them in the above-entitled matter. That I was retained by said 
defendant on or about the 10th day of May, 1991. 
2. That on or about the 10th day of May, 1991, I spoke 
to Leslie Van Frank, counsel for the plaintiff, to inquire about 
the possibility of settling the action in total, which my client 
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indicated a willingness to do, provided they were given credit for 
goods that they claim were returned to the plaintiff* 
3. On May 29, 1991, I sent to plaintiff's counsel a 
copy of the Memorandum generated by the plaintiff relating to 
defendant's claim that goods for credit were returned to the plaintifi 
4. On June 3, 1991, I received a reply from plaintiff's 
counsel in writing, a copy of which is attached hereto marked 
"Exhibit h'\ On or about June 5, 1991, I forwarded a copy of 
plaintiff's counsel's letter to the defendant for his information 
and response. I received no response from my client, and so on or 
about June 10, 1991, I called my client, inasmuch as I had not 
heard from him relatiave to plaintiff's letter that was forwarded 
to him from the plaintiff, as well as to inform him that he would 
need to assist in the preparation of responses to the plaintiff's 
interrogatories. At the time of this call, I was advised and 
informed that Mr. Bob Weeks, defendant's chief executive officer, 
had left the U. S. A. for the country of Chili on or about June 9, 
1991, and was not expected to return for a month. 
5. I was finally able to contact Mr. Weeks in Chili to 
obtain information from him with regard to the answers to the 
Interrogatories, which have now been answered and submitted to the 
plaintiff's counsel. 
FURTHER, AFFIANT SA¥ETH NOT. 
DATED, this the ^ / ^ d a y of July, 1991. 
DELWIN T. POND, Attorney for Defendant 
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Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on this the <? day 
of July, 1991. 
Notary Public , 
LYNN HEWARO I 
3479 Muriel Way I 
West Vatey City. Utah 04119. 
My CommiMion Expires * 
* * * o / U t a h I 
j 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a correct copy of the 
within and foregoing Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion 
for Entry of Judgment to plaintiff's counsel Leslie Van Frank at 
525 East First Sotfth, Fifth Floor Salt Lake City, Utah 84147j:5L008 
on this the "^)L^ day of July, 1991. ~ N 
nimsaff.d27 
DelwiLy. Pond #2623 
Attorney for Defendant 
923 East 5375 South 
Suite E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Tel (801) 264-8040 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
GRO ENTERPRISES, INC., dba 
CHICAGO BARTER CORP., 
Plaintiff , 
vs. 
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING 
SERVICES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
Defendant, National Insurances Services, Inc., pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Civil Proceedure hereby answers the Interrogatories 
under oath, as propounded by the plaintiff to the defendant, under 
date of January 3, 1991. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each paragraph of plaintifffs 
complaint which you specifically deny. 
ANSWER: Defendant specifically denies paragraphs 6 and 
7. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify each paragraph of plaintiff's 
complaint which you deny because you allegedly lack knowledge thereof. 
ANSWER: Defendant alleges that he is without knowledge 
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the complete 
truth or falsity of the averments contained in paragraph 3, 4,5 
and 8. 
ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 90-0906404-CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
2 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State the factual basis for your 
specific denial of the paragraphs identified in Interrogatory 
No. 1 herein* 
ANSWER: The factual basis for defendant's denial of 
paragraph'6 is that defendant returned, for credit, to the plaintiff 
goods and merchandise equal in value to $11,050.00, which amount 
plaintiff has not, but should have credited to the account of the 
defendant. Paragraph 7, defendant admits that he has failed and 
refused and does continue to fail and refuse to pay the amount 
plaintiff claims to be due in the sum of $12,559.70, but denies 
that such amount is due or owing, because appropriate credits in 
the sum of $11,050.00 has not been made to defendant's account. 
INTRERROGATORY NO. 4: State the factual basis for your 
affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction. 
ANSWER: The factual basis of affirmative defense of 
accord and satisfaction is that the defendant returned goods and 
merchandise to the plaintiff equal in the amount of $11,050.00, 
which should have been credited to the account of the defendant, 
wherefore, there should have been an accord and satisfaction 
entered into in the amount of $11,050.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: State the factual basis for your 
affirmative defense of estoppel. 
ANSWER: Due to the return of defective or outdated 
merchandise to the plaintiff, the plaintiff should be estopped 
from pursuing this action against the defendant. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: State the factual basis for your 
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affirmative defense of failure of consideration, 
ANSWER: The factual basis for the affirmative defense 
of failure consideration is that goods and services that were to 
be exchanged have been returned to the defendant in the sum of 
$11,050.00. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: State the factual basis for your 
affirmative defense of statute of limitations, 
ANSWER: Defendant believes that the account was opened 
more than four years prior to the date that the plaintiff commenced 
action against the defendant, and if so, to the extent that such 
agreements were verbal, and not in writing, the statute of limitations 
would have expired, thus barring the plaintiff's claim against the 
defendant to the extent of liability created by oral agreements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State the factual basis for your 
affirmative defense of statue of frauds. 
ANSWER: The factual basis for defendant's affirmative 
defense of the statute of frauds is that defendant believes that 
part of the agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the 
defendant was oral and not in writing, and to the extent that it 
was an oral agreement and not in writing, the statute of frauds 
will have barred defendant from action against the defendant on 
such oral agreements. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: State the factual basis for your 
affirmative defense of laches. 
ANSWER: The case is old, much time has expired, records 
have been lost or destroyed before the action was brought. For 
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this reason, it is inequitable to bring the action at this late 
and deferred date. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: State the factual basis to your 
claim that you are entitled to attorney's fees. 
ANSWER: The return of the goods by the defendant to the 
plaintiff, constitutes a substantial satisfaction of the debt and 
obligation that the defendant owed to the plaintiff, and that for 
plaintiff to now bring the action demanding more than the plaintiff 
is in fact entitled to, constitutes good cause for the defendant 
to ascert a claim for attorney's fees. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: Identify all defective materials 
you claim you returned to plaintiff for which you claim you are 
entitled to a credit. 
ANSWER: One hundred twenty five telephones, regular, 
valued at $35.00 each, total value $4,375*00. Twenty five telephones, 
cordless, $199.00 each, total value $4,975.00. Two Olivetti 
typewriters, $500.00 each, total value $1,000.00. Twenty cameras, 
$35.00 each, $700.00. Total goods and merchandise returned for 
credit, $11,050.00. 
125 t e l e p h o n e s , r e g u l a r @ 35.00 ea . $4,375.00 t o t a l value 
25 t e l e p h o n e s , c o r d l e s s @199.0Q ea . 4,975.00 t o t a l value 
2 O l i v e t t i t y p e w r i t e r s Q500.00 ea . 1,000.00 t o t a l value 
20 cameras , 35.00 ea . 700.00 t o t a l value 
t o t a l goods and merchandise r e tu rned $11,050.00 
DATED, t h i s the _ J day of J u l y , 1991. 
^^i^^tK^^H^iJ^^J^hKKV^inQ, SERVICES, INC. 
by ^crf? 
. BLLJ^J>OSC\<A^, Vic/i P re s iden t 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
) ss, 
) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Notary Public, in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah on this the ~< °°-x day of 
July, 1991. 
Notary Public
 f 
LYNN HEWARO » 
34 7*MuH*«W<iy I 
W»ftt V«.IWy Clry. Utah 04119! 
Mv CommiMion Exoiros I y ufO p
«Kin« 12,1934 I 
-~t^i*~1- u^/ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that 
within and foregoing Answers to 
counsel Leslie Van Frank at 525 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
I mailed a correct copy of the 
Interrogatories to plaintiff's 
East First South.,* Fifth Floor 
on this the J)/— day of July, 1991c 
ZL 
~F 
/ » / ^K <77Z 
n imsans *d27 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
A Prvfen$ionai Corporation 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
525 EAST FIRST SOUTH 
FIFTH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84102 
Matting Addre»* 
POST OFFICE BOX 11008 
BRUCE G. COHNE 84147-0008 Telephone (801) 532-2666 
RICHARD A. RAPPAPORT _, . .
 / o n n , . _ 1fl1Q 
ROGER G. SEGAL Telecopier (801) 355-1813 
JEFFREY L. SILVESTRINI 
WILLIAM B. WRAY, JR. — 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
JOIINT MORGAN November 2o, 1989 OFCOUNSEL 
KEITH W. MEADE JOHN B. MASON 
RAY M. BECK 
MICHAELS. EVANS 
GALE K. FRANCIS 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
MARTHA S. STONEBROOK 
CLAIRE G. ZANOLLI 
LESUE VAN FRANK 
M. JOY DOUGLAS 
National Insurance Marketing 
5505 South 900 East, Suite 220 
Holliday, Utah 84117 
RE: Your account with Chicago Barter Corp. 
Gentlemen: 
You have failed to respond to my previous letter dated 
November 17, 1989, concerning your obligation to the above 
captioned creditor. This letter will serve as a reminder of that 
prior letter, and also as a reminder of your unpaid obligation in 
the amount of $10,873.37. 
If I have not received your remittance in full nor heard 
from you within five (5) days of the date hereof, you will leave 
the creditor with no alternative but to commence suit for 
collection of this sum, in which case interest, costs of Court 
and any and all other applicable expenses, such as attorney' s 
fees, will be included in the.amount, sued for, to your detriment. 
The choice is yours. ( 
\ 
i'1'y' yours, 
RGS: lc 
/4 
Roger G. \Setokl 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
LYNN P. HEWARD #14 79 
DELWIN T. POND #2623 
Attorneys for Defendant 
923 East 5375 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Tel. 264-8040 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GRO ENTERPRISES, INC., dba CHICAGO ) AFFIDAVIT OF 
BARTER CORP., ) DELWIN T. POND 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
NATIONAL INSURANCE MARKETING SERVICES, ) 
INC., a Utah corporation, ) Civil No. 900906404CN 
Defendant. ) Judqe J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
)ss. 
County of Salt Lake ) 
Delwin T. Pond, being first duly sworn, deposes and says 
that: 
L I am one of the attorneys for the defendant herein, 
and I was the only attorney for the defendant during the time 
period in which the events described herein took place. 
2. When I was first approached to serve as defendant's 
attorney, I was informed by a principal of defendant, Robert 
Weeks, that there were some interrogatories that needed to be 
answered. There was no desire expressed or evident on the part of 
the defendant to postpone or avoid the answering of the 
interrogatories. 
3. On that occasion, and as indicated in my affidavit 
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dated July 2, 1991 and filed herein, I spoke to Leslie Van Frank, 
the attorney for the defendant, relative to settling the case on 
the basis of the defendant paying all that would be left after the 
credit that had been omitted. 
4. Ms. Van Frank indicated at that time that she did 
not know about any possible credit. She acceded to my request to 
check on that and get back to me. 
5. It was my opinion, and I so informed Mr. Weeks, that 
based upon the defendant's willingness to pay anything owed after 
the appropriate credits were made, this case should be fairly 
simple and should settle. 
6. There had been a Request for Production of Documents, 
and I sent Ms. Van Frank a copy of a letter dated May 26, 1987 
showing the items returned by defendant to plaintiff for a total 
credit of $11,050, a copy of which letter is attached hereto. 
7. In view of this apparent likelihood of settlement, 
it appeared that the immediate response to the interrogatories 
would incur unnecessary costs. 
8. Ms. Van Frank gave no indication she did not feel 
the same. That is, she did not mention the need for immediate an 
response except and until such was contained in her letter dated 
June 3, 1991. 
9. I~ searching for information with which to draft the 
Anwers to Interrogatories without the help of Mr. Weeks, who had 
left the country without my knowledge, I contacted Mr. Bosqraff 
and Mrs. Weeks and tried on numerous occasions to contact defendant's 
former attorney, Mr. Turner. However no one I spoke with had the 
information I needed, and Mr. Turner never returned my calls. 
10. So I could not draft meaningful answers until I was 
able to speak again with Mr. Weeks in Chile. 
11. Thus once it became clear that the Interrogatories 
would need to be answered after all, I and the defendant did all 
we could to expeditiously submit the Answers^ * 
DATED this /5~' day of Aw&tdttK', 1991. 
Dtft-WIN T. POND 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /> 
A ^ ^ ^ A _ , 1991. 
day of 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY FUBLICT 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
;• • v ;v lie i 
r..,.' hL\7 ..»D 1 
v/oct v«s:c- c v unh04i t * | 
f 'j C rr.nrv n Expires I 
Juno 1- . 10-4 I 
Slate cl U»ah | 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit was mailed to Leslie Van Frank, P.O. Box 11008, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84147 on this / >^ ~"~ day of / l / ^ - ^ - ^ - r 1991, with 
postage attached thereon. 
rsro 
Natioi \u\ insurance 
Marketing Services, 
Incorporated 
May 26, 1987 
Chicago Barter Corp 
8 00 E. Roosevelt Road 
Lombard, Illinois 60148 
Subject: Defective items 
°lease credit our account for the following items that have 
been returned to you, as they are either defective or outdated 
125 Telephones, regular 
25 Telephones, cordless 
2 Typewriters, Olivetti 
20 Cameras 
$ 35, 
199, 
500, 
35. 
00 
00 
00 
00 
ea 
ea 
ea 
ea 
Total Credit 
$ 4,375.00 
4,975.00 
1,000.00 
700.00 
$11,050.00 
Robert Weeks 
vq /J 
Sports Mall Plaza 5505 South 900 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 Phone: (801) 261-3888 
